主题：Electoral Engineering:One Man,One Bid
作者：JacobK.Goeree and Jingjing Zhang
主讲人：Jingjing Zhang
时间：2012年11月5日下午3点
报告地点：浙江大学紫金港校区东三312 （实验社会科学实验室）
Abstract:
We compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice, e.g. adopt one of two proposals. We show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred, simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome. The fraction of the surplus lost rises with the number of voters and the total surplus loss diverges in the limit when the number of voters grows large. We introduce a simple bidding mechanism where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost and voters receive rebates equal to the average of others' payments. This mechanism is budget-balanced, individually rational, and fully efficient in the limit. Moreover, the mechanism redistributes from those that gain from the outcome to those that lose and everyone is better off under bidding compared to voting.
We test the two mechanisms in the lab using an environment with "moderate" and "extremist" voters. In the first part of the experiment, subjects gain experience with both bidding and voting. Then they collectively decide which mechanism applies in the second part. This endogenous choice of institutions provides clear evidence in favor of bidding: with groups of size eleven, 90% of the groups opt for the bidding mechanism. The observed efficiency losses under voting are close to theoretical predictions and significantly larger than under bidding. Because of redistribution, the efficiency gain from bidding benefits mostly the moderate voters. Observed behavior under the bidding mechanism deviates from theoretical predictions to some extent, which can be explained by a quantal response equilibrium model if we assume that voters overestimate the chance of being pivotal.
主讲人简介：
EDUCATION
Ph.D. Purdue University August 2008
Economics Krannert School of Management
M.S. Purdue University December 2004
Economics Krannert School of Management
B.A. Zhejiang Gongshang University (China) June 2003
Economics Bachelor’s Degree with Honors
RESEARCH FIELDS
Experimental and Behavioral Economics, Public Economics, Industrial Organization
PROFESSIONAL
EXPERIENCE Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, University of Zurich 2010-now
Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Economics, McMaster University
Affiliated with Center for Health Economics and Policy Analysis 2008-2010
Instructor, Department of Economics, University of Zurich
Course: Groups in Economic Decision-Making (graduate) Spring 2011
Instructor, Department of Economics, McMaster University Spring 2012
Course: Economics of Public Sector Policy & Human Resources Fall 2009
Economics Policy (graduate)
Instructor, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University Spring 2006
Course: Microeconomics (undergraduate)