浙江大学实验社会科学实验室将于2013年11月30日（星期六）进行实验经济学专题研讨会，来自清华大学和浙江大学的研究人员将做三场相关报告。

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具体内容如下：

时间：2013年11月30日（星期六） 下午13:30-17:30 

地点：浙江大学紫金港校区东三312，浙江大学实验社会科学实验室

专题1：Facilitating Mixed Strategy Equilibria: Revisiting the Asymmetric Matching Pennies Contradiction

主讲人：郑捷  清华大学经济管理学院

摘要：We revisit the asymmetric matching pennies problem posed by Goeree and Holt (2001). In their one-shot matching pennies games, they find that experimental subjects’ choices appear to be based on their own payoff magnitudes, contrary to the prediction of mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium. The resulting suggestion is that mixed strategy equilibrium seems to only work by coincidence in the case of symmetry.We conduct experiments to further investigate this issue. We consider two main treatments: repetition under random partner re-matching, and under same partner fixed matching. Contrary to the previous findings, we find row player’s behavior is actually very close to the mixed strategy equilibrium, suggesting that the results from the one-shot setting may misrepresent subjects’ tendencies to play equilibrium. We also find in support of theory, that random re-matching facilitates equilibrium frequencies. While subjects’ behavior overall (especially that of the column player) still does not adhere exactly to the theoretical prediction, our findings are much more in support of equilibrium than previous evidence suggests.

主讲人介绍：郑捷，清华大学经济管理学院经济系助理教授。2003年获得清华大学经济学学士学位，2005年获得清华大学经济学硕士学位。2007年获得美国华盛顿大学经济学硕士学位，2011年获得华盛顿大学经济学博士学位。研究领域包括微观经济理论、产业组织、金融经济学、实验经济学。当前研究主要为理性泡沫、健忘与福利、自我控制。

专题2：A Comment on Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment

主讲人：祝思倩   浙江大学

摘要：In Timothy N. Cason,Daniel Friedman and Ed Hopkins's recent paper, Cycles and Instability in a Rock-Paper-Scissors Population Game: A Continuous Time Experiment (The Review of Economic Studies, 2013), the authors claim that control treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit weak or no cycles. In this comment, we point out that the computing method of counting CCT (counter-clockwise transits) and CT (clockwise transits) is erroneous, which leads to the incorrectness of a crucial index, the cycle rotation index. Additionally, after we rectify the computing method and replace the former null hypothesis of Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test with a more explicit but interchangeable one, the result shows that one of the two Discrete treatments for the Stable game S exhibits significant cyclical behavior,contradicting the authors' previous statement.

专题3：An attention-based stationary concept for Experimental 2x2-Games

主讲人：程奇奇   浙江大学

摘要：This paper introduces an attention-based view of payoffs and choices in the mixed strategy games and brings this view to the exist models, Nash equilibrium, Quantal response equilibrium and Impulse balance equilibrium. The view posits that individuals can't equally attend to the two choices if they are not equivalent in drawing the attention, leading to a weight-related effect on each choice, and finally having an effect on the stationary state. The extended models based on this view give a significant improvement in prediction the stationary statein zero-sum games, by examining data from published papers [Selten, R. and T. Chmura (2008), McKelvey, R. D., T. R. Palfrey and R. A. Weber (2000)]and predicts at lease as well as other three stationary conceptions in overall games.